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Abstract: The multi-armed bandit problem (MBP) is the problem of finding, as accurately and quickly as possible, the
most profitable option from a set of options that gives stochastic rewards by referring to past experiences. Inspired by
fluctuated movements of a rigid body in a tug-of-war game, we formulated a unique search algorithm that we call the
‘tug-of-war (TOW) dynamics’ for solving the MBP efficiently [1-5]. The cognitive medium access, which refers to multi-
user channel allocations in cognitive radio, can be interpreted as the competitive multi-armed bandit problem (CMBP);
the problem is to determine the optimal strategy for allocating channels to users which yields maximum total rewards
gained by all users [6]. Here we show that it is possible to construct a physical device for solving the CMBP, which we
call the ‘TOW Bombe’, by exploiting the TOW dynamics existed in coupled incompressible-fluid cylinders. This analog
computing device achieves the ‘socially-maximum’ resource allocation that maximizes the total rewards in cognitive
medium access without paying a huge computational cost that grows exponentially as a function of the problem size.
INTRODUCTION
Consider two slot machines. Both machines have in-
dividual reward probabilities PA and PB . At each trial, a
player selects one of machines and obtains some reward,
for example, a coin, with the corresponding probability.
The player wants to maximize the total reward sum ob-
tained after a certain number of selections. However, it
is supposed that the player does not know these prob-
abilities. The multi-armed bandit problem (MBP) is to
determine the optimal strategy for selecting the machine
which yields maximum rewards by referring to past ex-
periences.
In our previous studies [1-6], we have shown that
our proposed algorithm called the Tug-of-War (TOW)
dynamics is more efficient than other well-known al-
gorithms such as the modified ǫ-greedy algorithm and
modified softmax algorithm, and comparable to the ‘up-
per confidence bound1-tuned (UCB1T) algorithm’ that
is known as the best algorithm among parameter-free al-
gorithms [7]. Moreover, the TOW dynamics effectively
adapts to a changing environment in which the reward
probabilities dynamically switch. The algorithms for
solving the MBP are useful for various applications, such
as the cognitive radio [8, 9], web advertising [10], and
the Monte-Carlo tree search that is used for programming
computers to play ‘game of GO’ [11, 12].
Recently, the cognitive medium access problem is one
of the hottest topics in the field of mobile communica-
tions [8, 9]. The underlying idea is to allow unlicensed
users (i.e., cognitive users) to access the available spec-
trum when the licensed users (i.e., primary users) are not
active. The cognitive medium access is a new medium ac-
cess paradigm in which the cognitive users should not in-
terfere with the licensed users. To avoid interfering with
the primary network, the cognitive users must first probe
to determine whether there are primary activities in each
channel before transmission.
Figure 1 shows the channel model proposed by Lai et
al. [8, 9]. There is a primary network consisting of N
Fig. 1 Channel model.
channels, each with bandwidth B. The users in the pri-
mary network are operated in a synchronous time-slotted
fashion. It is assumed that, at each time slot, channel i is
free with probability Pi. The cognitive users do not know
Pi a priori. At each time slot, the cognitive users attempt
to exploit the availability of channels in the primary net-
work by sensing the activity in this channel model. In
this setting, a single cognitive user can access only a sin-
gle channel at any given time. The problem is to derive
an optimal accessing strategy for choosing channels that
maximizes the expected throughput obtained by the cog-
nitive user. This situation can be interpreted as the multi-
user competitive bandit problem (CMBP).
For simplicity, we consider the minimum CMBP, i.e.,
2 cognitive (unlicensed) users (1 and 2) and 2 channels
(A and B). Each channel is not occupied by primary (li-
censed) users with the probability Pi. In the MBP con-
text, we assume that the user accessing a free channel can
get some reward, for example a coin, with the probabil-
ity Pi. Table 1 shows the payoff matrix for user 1 and
2. When two cognitive users select the same channel, the
Table 1 Payoff matrix for user 1 (user 2).
user 2: A user 2: B
user 1: A PA/2 (PA/2) PA (PB)
user 1: B PB (PA) PB/2 (PB/2)
collision occurs, and the reward is evenly split between
the collided users.
In order to develop a unified framework for the de-
sign of efficient, and low complexity, cognitive medium
access protocols, we have to seek an algorithm that can
obtain the maximum total rewards (scores) in the CMBP
context. In order to acquire the maximum total rewards,
the algorithm has to have a mechanism that can avoid the
‘Nash equilibrium’ which is the natural consequence for
a group of independent selfish users.
In this study, we demonstrate that overall optimiza-
tion (the maximum total rewards) can be derived by
using a physical device consisting of two kinds of
incompressible-fluid in two or more cylinders. We call
this analog computing device the ‘Tug-of-War (TOW)
Bombe’ because it is analogous to the ‘Turing Bombe,’
which is an analog electric circuit developed by the
British army during World War II for decoding the
‘enigma code’ of the German army [13]. If one tries to
solve the CMBP for M users and N channels using a
conventional digital computer, it is necessary to calculate
evaluation values of O(NM ) for each iteration; the com-
putational cost for solving the CMBP grows as an expo-
nential function of N and M . Nevertheless, the TOW
Bombe enables to solve the problem without paying the
exponential computational cost. At each iteration, the
TOW Bombe only requires M up-and-down operations
for controlling the fluid interface levels in the correspond-
ing cylinders.
1. THE TUG-OF-WAR DYNAMICS
In the previous studies [4, 6], we proposed the Tug-of-
War (TOW) dynamics. Consider incompressible-fluid in
a cylinder, as shown in Fig. 2. Here, variable Xk corre-
sponds to the displacement of terminal k from an initial
position, where k ∈ {A,B}. If Xk is greater than 0, we
consider that the liquid selects machine k.
We used the following estimate Qk (k ∈ {A,B}):
Qk(t) = Nk(t)− (1 + ω)Lk(t). (1)
Here, Nk is the number of playing machine k until time t,
and Lk is the number of non-rewarded (i.e., failed) events
in k until time t, where ω is a weighting parameter.
The displacement XA (= −XB) is determined by the
following difference equation:
XA(t) = QA(t)−QB(t) + δ. (2)
Here, δ(t) is an arbitrary fluctuation to which the liquid is
subjected. Consequently the TOW dynamics evolve ac-
Fig. 2 TOW dynamics.
cording to a particularly simple rule: in addition to the
fluctuation, if machine k is played at each time t, +1
and −ω are added to Xk(t− 1) when rewarded and non-
rewarded, respectively (Fig. 2). The authors have shown
that this simple dynamics gains more rewards (coins or
packet transmissions) than that obtained by other popular
algorithms for solving the MBP [1, 2].
1.1. The Tug-of-War Principle
In this subsection, we derive the learning rules of the
TOW dynamics from a thought experiment, so that we
can obtain the nearly optimal weighting parameter ω0.
In many popular algorithms such as ǫ-greedy algorithm,
an estimate for reward probability is updated only in a
selected arm. In contrast, we consider the case that the
sum of the reward probabilities γ = PA + PB is given in
advance. Then, we can update both estimates simultane-
ously as follows,
A: NA−LA
NA
B: γ − NA−LA
NA
,
A: γ − NB−LB
NB
B: NB−LB
NB
.
Here, the top and bottom rows give the estimates based
on NA times selecting A and NB times selecting B, re-
spectively.
Each expected reward based on NA times selecting A
and NB times selecting B is given as follows,
Q′k = Nk
Nk − Lk
Nk
+Nj
(
γ −
Nj − Lj
Nj
)
= Nk − Lk + (γ − 1) Nj + Lj . (3)
Here, j is B if k is A, or A if k is B. These expected
rewards Q′ks are not the same as the learning rules of the
TOW, Qks in Eq.(1). However, the following difference
is directly used in the TOW,
QA −QB = (NA −NB)− (1 + ω) (LA − LB). (4)
When we transform the expected rewards Q′ks into
Q′′k = Q
′
k/(2− γ), (5)
we can obtain the difference
Q′′A −Q
′′
B = (NA −NB)−
2
2− γ
(LA − LB). (6)
Comparing the coefficient of Eq.(4) and (6), those two
differences are always equal when ω=ω0 satisfies
ω0 =
γ
2− γ
. (7)
Eventually, we can obtain the nearly optimal weighting
parameter ω0 in terms of γ.
This derivation means that the TOW has an equivalent
learning rule with the system that is able to update both
of the two estimates simultaneously. The TOW can im-
itate the system that determines its next moves at time
t+ 1 in referring to the estimate of each machine even if
it was not selected at time t, as if the two machines were
selected simultaneously at time t. This unique feature in
the learning rule is one of origins of the high performance
of the TOW.
We carried out Monte Carlo simulations and con-
firmed that the performance of the TOW with ω0 is com-
parable to its best performance, i.e., TOW with ωopt. De-
tailed descriptions on these results will be presented else-
where [14]. In addition, the essence of the process de-
scribed here can be generalized to K-machine and M -
player cases. All we need is the following ω0:
ω0 =
γ′
2− γ′
, (8)
γ′ = P(M) + P(M+1). (9)
Here, P(M) denotes the top M -th reward probability. In
fact, for K-machine and M -player cases, we have de-
signed a physical decision-making device that achieves
the overall optimal state quickly and accurately [15].
2. THE TUG-OF-WAR BOMBE
The decision-making device called the ‘Tug-of-War
(TOW) Bombe’ for 3 users (1, 2, and 3) and 5 chan-
nels (A,B,C,D, and E) is illustrated in Figure 3. Two
kinds of incompressible-fluid (red and blue) are filled in
coupled cylinders. The red (bottom) fluid handles the
‘decision-making of a user’, while the blue (upper) one
handles the ‘interaction among users’. Channel selec-
tion of each user at each iteration is determined by the
height of a green adjuster (a fluid interface level), and
the highest channel is chosen. When the movements of
red and blue adjusters stabilize to reach equilibrium, the
‘tug-of-war principle’ in red fluid holds for each user. In
other words, when one interface goes up, other four in-
terfaces fall down, and efficient channel selections are at-
tained. Simultaneously, the ‘action-reaction law’ is held
by blue fluid (i.e., if the interface level of user1 goes up,
the interface levels of user2 and 3 fall down), which con-
tributes to avoid collisions, and the TOW Bombe is able
to search for an overall optimization solution accurately
and quickly.
The dynamics of the TOW Bombe are expressed as
follows:
Q(i,k)(t) = ∆Q(i,k)(t) +Q(i,k)(t− 1)
−
1
M − 1
∑
j 6=i
∆Q(j,k)(t), (10)
A
C
B
D
E
USER1
USER2
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Fig. 3 The TOW Bombe for 3 users and 5 channels.
X(i,k)(t) = Q(i,k)(t)−
1
N − 1
∑
l 6=k
Q(i,l)(t). (11)
Here, X(i,k)(t) denotes the height of the interface of user
i and channel k at iteration step t. If channel k is chosen
for user i at time t, ∆Q(i,k)(t) is +1 or −ω according to
the result (rewarded or not). Otherwise, it is 0.
In addition to the above-mentioned dynamics, oscil-
lations are added to X(i,k). These oscillations are given
from the external by controlling the blue and red adjusters
appropriately. In this paper, we show the cases where
the completely-synchronized oscillations osc(i,k)(t) are
added to all the users,
osc(i,k)(t) = A sin(2πt/5 + 2π(k − 1)/5). (12)
Here, k = 1, · · ·, 5.
Thus, the TOW Bombe operates only by adding an op-
eration which goes up or down the interface level (+1 or
−ω) according to the result (success or failure of packet
transmission) for each user (total M times) at every time.
After these operations, the interface levels move accord-
ing to the volume conservation law, and it calculates next
selection for each user. In the each user’s selection, an
efficient search is realized due to the ‘TOW principle’
which can obtain a solution accurately and quickly in
trial-and-error tasks. Moreover, by the interaction be-
tween users via blue fluid, the ‘Nash equilibrium’ can
be avoided consequently, and it achieves the overall opti-
mization called ‘social maximum’ [16].
3. RESULTS
In order to show that the TOW Bombe certainly avoids
the Nash equilibrium and regularly achieves an overall
optimization, we consider a case where (PA, PB , PC ,
PD , PE ) = (0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9) as a typical ex-
ample. A part of the payoff tensor that has 125 (=53)
elements is described as follows for simplicity; only ma-
trix elements for which each user does not choose low-
ranking A and B are shown (Table 2, 3, and 4). For each
matrix element, the reward probabilities are given in the
order of users 1, 2, and 3.
‘Social maximum (SM)’ is a state in which the max-
imum amount of total reward sum is obtained by all the
users. In this problem, the social maximum corresponds
to a ‘segregation state’ in which the users choose top three
different machines (C,D,E) respectively; there exist six
segregation states that are indicated by SM in the Tables.
On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium (NE) is a state in
Table 2 Payoff matrix of the case where (PC , PD ,
PE)=(0.1, 0.2, 0.9), user 3 chooses C.
2: C 2: D 2: E
1: C 1/30, 1/30, 1/30 .05, .2, .05 .05, .9, .05
1: D .2, .05, .05 .1, .1, .1 .2, .9, .1 SM
1: E .9, .05, .05 .9, .2, .1 SM .45, .45, .1
Table 3 Payoff matrix of the case where (PC , PD ,
PE )=(0.1, 0.2, 0.9), user 3 chooses D.
2: C 2: D 2: E
1: C .05, .05, .2 .1, .1, .1 .1, .9, .2 SM
1: D .1, .1, .1 2/30, 2/30, 2/30 .1, .9, .1
1: E .9, .1, .2 SM .9, .1, .1 .45, .45, .2
Table 4 Payoff matrix of the case where (PC , PD ,
PE)=(0.1, 0.2, 0.9), user 3 chooses E.
2: C 2: D 2: E
1: C .05, .05, .9 .1, .2, .9 SM .1, .45, .45
1: D .2, .1, .9 SM .1, .1, .9 .2, .45, .45
1: E .45, .1, .45 .45, .2, .45 .3, .3, .3 NE
which all the users choose machine E independently of
others’ decisions; machine E gives the reward with the
highest probability when each user behaves in a selfish
manner.
The performance of the TOW Bombe was evaluated
by a score: the number of rewards (coins) a user ob-
tained in his (her) 1000 plays. In cognitive radio, the
score corresponds to the amount of packets that has suc-
cessfully transmitted. Figure 4 shows the scores of the
TOW Bombe in the typical example where (PA, PB , PC ,
PD , PE) = (0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9). Since 1000 sam-
ples were used, there are 1000 circles for each data. Each
circle indicates the score obtained by user i (horizontal
axis) and user j (vertical axis) for one sample. There
exist six clusters in Figure 4. These clusters correspond
to the two dimensional projections of the six segregation
states, implying the overall optimization. The social max-
imum points are given as follows: (the score of user 1, the
score of user 2, the score of user 3) = (100, 200, 900),
(100, 900, 200), (200, 100, 900), (200, 900, 100), (900,
100, 200), and (900, 200, 100). The TOW Bombe did not
reach the Nash equilibrium state (300, 300, 300).
Figure 5 shows sample averages of the scores un-
til 1000 plays, where we showed the average of each
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Fig. 4 Scores of the TOW Bombe in the case where (PA,
PB , PC , PD, PE) = (0.03, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9).
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Fig. 5 Sample averages of the scores of the TOW Bombe
in the case where (PA, PB , PC , PD , PE ) = (0.03,
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.9).
user’s score and that of the total score of all the users.
We can see that the average total score has gained
100+200+900=1200, which is the value of the social
maximum, while the fairness is maintained in most cases.
Here, we set parameter ω at 0.08 (Eq. (8) and (9) were
calculated as γ′=PB+PC).
4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We demonstrated that an analog decision-making de-
vice, called the TOW Bombe, is implemented physically
by using two kinds of incompressible-fluid in coupled
cylinders and achieves overall optimization in the channel
allocation problem in cognitive radio. The TOW Bombe
enables to solve the allocation problem for M users and
N channels by repeating M up-and-down operations of
the fluid interface levels in the cylinders at each iteration;
it does not require the calculation of exponentially-many
(O(NM )) evaluation values that are required when using
a conventional digital computer. This suggests that an
advantage of analog computation do exist even in today’s
digital age.
The TOW Bombe can also be implemented on the ba-
sis of quantum physics. In fact, the authors have exploited
optical energy transfer dynamics between quantum dots
to construct the decision-making device [17, 18]. Our
method may be applicable not only to a class problem de-
rived from cognitive radio but also to broader varieties of
game payoff matrices, implying that wider applications
are expected. We will report these observations and re-
sults elsewhere in the future.
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